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COMMENTS
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: IS IT TIME?
I. INTRODUCTION
From birth, our mortality is a harsh fact of life that we all face. "Mortal-
ity" is defined as "the state or condition of being subject to death."' In other
words, once born, we are all destined to die. Despite this inevitability, most
individuals are uncomfortable with the idea of death and the finality of its
occurrence. Facing one's own mortality is not an easy task for the vast ma-
jority of the human population.
Coming to terms with one's own mortality and impending death is made
even more difficult when death is contemplated in conjunction with a termi-
nal illness that is nothing more than a constant and excruciating source of
pain for the patient. Such patients are not content to wait and let natural
death claim their lives. To these individuals, advances in medical science
and technology, which have enabled the medical profession to prolong the
lives of terminally ill patients beyond what was possible before, represent
progress that merely aggravates their suffering and pain.
Progress in medical science directed towards decreasing pain and pro-
longing life has, to be sure, blurred the line between life and death. To the
terminally ill facing constant pain, this progress merely represents the means
to prolong their suffering. Justifiably, these individuals who are suffering
unbearable pain demand a hastening of their death so that they may be re-
lieved of pain and an existence that offers nothing more than palliative care
that is certain to fail at some point in the treatment.
Consequently, terminally ill patients request their physician's assistance
in hastening their death and putting an end to their pain and suffering. This
would require the physician to engage in physician-assisted suicide, a prac-
tice that has been ethically and legally sanctioned nationwide for years.
While many courts have recognized a patient's right to die by refusal or
withdrawal of life-support mechanisms,2 physician-assisted suicide is still
criminally sanctioned in all the states of this country, except Oregon.' On
1. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 773 (9th ed. 1991) (entries under "mortal-
ity" and "mortal").
2. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990);
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976).
3. See International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, Special Report: Oregon's Death Wish:
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November 4, 1997, the people of Oregon voted in favor of legalizing physi-
cian-assisted suicide for terminally ill patients Since 1990, several other
states have attempted to legalize physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill
patients, but voters in these states have rejected such proposed legislation.5
This comment will analyze approved legislation as well as a proposition
being formulated to legalize physician-assisted suicide in the United States.
In particular, the analysis will focus on the safeguards incorporated in the
legislation, and the proposal against the abuse of this practice that has been
observed in the Netherlands. Part II of this comment discuss physician-
assisted suicide and the moral, ethical, and medical considerations associated
with this practice. Part III will deal with physician-assisted suicide in the
Netherlands. Part IV will describe the current state of U.S. law regarding
physician-assisted suicide. Part V will analyze Oregon's "Death With Dig-
nity Act" and the safeguards it incorporates to combat abuse, while part VI
will deal with California's attempt to legalize physician-assisted suicide. Fi-
nally, part VII will provide a conclusion to this comment.
I. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Physician-assisted suicide refers to a physician's involvement in pro-
viding a painless, rapid, and humane death to a patient in intractable pain
who wishes to die, but is unable to do so unassisted.' According to the
American Medical Association, physician-assisted suicide occurs when a
physician facilitates the death of a patient by providing the necessary means
to enable the patient to end his or her life.7 In other words, the doctor gives
the patient a death-producing means with which the patient brings about his
or her own death.
It has been said that physician-assisted suicide is incompatible with the
role of a physician as a healer.8 Implied by this is the notion that a physi-
cian's duty is to provide treatment, not cause death, even upon the patient's
request.9 In fact, it has been argued that requests for physician-assisted sui-
The Vote and the Aftermath (visited Apr. 13, 1999) <http://www.iaetf.org>.
4. See Ellen Goodman, Oregon's Parachute for the Terminally Ill, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Nov. 10, 1997, at A09; Patrick O'Neill, Oregon Medical Association Will Follow Suicide
Provisions, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 10, 1997, at A01; Patrick O'Neill & Steve Wood-
ward, Assisted Suicide Turns From Theory to Details, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 9, 1997,
at A01; Ellen Goodman, Nation Turns to Oregon, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 8, 1997, at
D06.
5. See Dick Lehr, Physicians Face Wrenching Choices, Requests For Help in Dying
Produce a Professional Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27, 1993, at 1.
6. See Leslie L. Mangini, To Help or Not to Help: Assisted Suicide and its Moral, Ethi-
cal, and Legal Ramifications, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 728, 731 (1994).
7. Id. at 745 (citing Council Report: Decisions Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229
(1992)).
8. Leon Kass, Neither For Love Nor For Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, 94 PUB.
INTEREST 25, 30 (1989).
9. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Physi-
334 [Vol. 35
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cide are to be regarded as cries for help." However, while the physical pain
patients feel can be alleviated, this is not true for all physical pain. There
comes a point in the treatment when the patient is beyond responding to pal-
liative pain medication, and must endure pain and suffering until death.
It has been stated that physicians are providers of comfort just as much
as they are healers of illness." In the event of a conflict between these two
roles, it is unclear why the physician's role as a provider of comfort is
treated as subordinate to his role as a healer.2 If a physician's fundamental
role is to relieve disease and discomfort, and included within this role is
promotion of health, then physician-assisted suicide may be regarded as not
only compatible with the physician's role, but in fact incumbent on the phy-
sician." While it has been reported that physician-assisted suicide would
threaten the doctor-patient relationship,'4 what breeds mistrust between pa-
tients and physicians is not that physicians will prescribe lethal agents, but
that they will not do so in the face of patients' intolerable suffering. 5
As expressed by its representative, the American Medical Association
(AMA) is vehemently opposed to physician-assisted suicide, and considers it
to irreversibly exclude other medical, psychological, and social avenues
available to the ill patient. 6 The AMA argues that physician-assisted suicide
is simply an intentional taking of the patient's life, even if it is with the pa-
tient's consent, and that such an act is not considered to be within the realm
of medical practice.
Further, the government opposes physician-assisted suicide. During a
Presidential campaign in Detroit, in 1992, President Clinton expressed his
opposition to physician-assisted suicide." He also stated that he would veto
any bill attempting to legalize that practice in this country.'
Opponents of physician-assisted suicide provide several reasons for
cian-Assisted Suicide, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 91, 93 (1994).
10. See Mangini, supra note 6, at 750 (citing Harry R. Moody, In My Opinion, AARP
BULL., Sept. 1993, at 22).
11. See David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Very Mod-
est Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REv. 443, 452 (1997) (citing Ezekiel J. Manuel, Euthanasia: His-
torical, Ethical, and Empiric Perspectives, 154 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 1890, 1893 (1994)).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Mangini, supra note 6, at 750 (citing Dr. John King, Address at the American
Medical Ass'n National Meeting (1991)).
15. See id. at 751-52.
16. See Samuel F. Hunter, Active Euthanasia Violates Fundamental Principles, 262
JAMA 3074 (1989).
17. See Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die With Assistance, 105
HARV. L. REv. 2021, 2021 n.4 (citing COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE
AMER. MED. Ass'N REPORTS § 12, at 2 (1989)).
18. See Mangini, supra note 6, at 755 (citing NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS/SECRETARIAT FOR PRO-LIFE ACTIvITIES, A CHRONICLE OF EUTHANASIA: TRENDS IN
AMERICA, LIFE AT RISK 1 (1992)).
19. Id.
1999]
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their opposition to this practice. First, this practice would destroy the doctor-
patient relationship; the patient cannot be sure of the doctor's role as a healer
because he would also be authorized to kill.2" Next, opponents fear that this
practice will increase the number of misdiagnosed cases, leading to invol-
untary deaths of patients.2 Further, physician-assisted suicide would lead to
a decreased incentive to research and develop new methods of providing
palliative care and life-sustaining treatment. Finally, public policy argues
against this practice which, if legitimized, would lead to a degradation of so-
cietal values.23
Although there is significant opposition to the physician-assisted suicide
movement in this country, many doctors and members of the public appear
to support this practice. The people of Oregon have voted to legalize physi-
cian-assisted suicide in Oregon with the passage of the "Death With Dignity
Act."' Commentators and scholars have opined that physician-assisted sui-
cide of terminally ill patients, which allows them to die with dignity, does
not constitute a violation of society's moralistic values."
Physician-assisted suicide is also supported by the Hemlock Society,
whose founder and former Executive Director, Dr. Derek Humphrey, is a
staunch advocate of this practice for several social, professional, and medical
reasons. 7 However, he acknowledges that a physician should assist only in
the death of a terminally ill patient who requests assistance. 8
Proponents of physician-assisted suicide favor the practice for several
reasons. They demand legalization of this practice so that a terminally ill pa-
tient may have total control over his or her quality of life.29 This would allow
a dying patient to exercise his or her personal liberty, free of any restraint, in
requesting assistance in dying? Further, a dying patient's choice to request
20. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW §17-69, at 423-24 (1995); Mark E.
Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a Wonderful Life?, 70 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 519, 527 (1995).
21. See FURRO NE AL., supra note 20, §17-69, at 423-24.
22. See id.
23. See Alison C. Hall, To Die With Dignity: Comparing Physician Assisted Suicide In
the United States, Japan and the Netherlands, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 803, 809 (1996) (citing
Chopko & Moses, supra note 20, at 527).
24. See generally Ronald Kotulak, Murder Charge Dismissed Against Suicide Doctor,
CHi. TRIB., Dec. 14, 1990, at Cl.
25. 13 OR. REV. STAT. § 2.01 (1998).
26. See Note, supra note 17, at 2021 n.4 (citing Sidney H. Wanzer, The Physician's Re-
sponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look, 320 NEv ENG. 1. MED. 844, 848
(1989)); Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity-A Case of Individualized Decision Making,
324 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 691 (1991).
27. See Mangini, supra note 6, at 752-53.
28. See id.
29. See Hall, supra note 23, at 810 (citing John W. Dalbey Donahue, Physician-Assisted
Suicide: A "Right" Reserved Only For the Competent?, 19 VT. L. Ray. 795 (1995)).
30. See id.
[Vol. 35
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assistance affects only that patient, and harms no one else.3 ' Finally, it has
been argued that a patient's right to self-determination outweighs all other
interests." It is more humane to relieve patients of suffering and allow them
to end their life, particularly when current medical practice supports the pa-
tient's right to refuse or withhold treatment or other life-sustaining tech-
niques.33
Physician-assisted suicide is a topic of national debate, and is charged
with emotion. An individual's right to privacy and self-determination has
been established by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Griswold v.
Connecticut34 and Roe v. Wade." When applied to the issue of physician-
assisted suicide, however, these constitutionally guaranteed rights directly
conflict with a state's compelling interest in preserving human life, which in
turn conflicts with an individual's compelling interest in maintaining dignity,
even in death. This conflict has, therefore, created a national controversy
which promises to be ensconced in American society for years to come. That
being true, the American legal system now faces a time of evaluation and,
perhaps, change.
III. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE NETHERLANDS
Right-to-die advocates often rely on the practice in the Netherlands as a
model for the way in which physician-assisted suicide may be practiced in
this country for the benefit of competent, but terminally ill, patients wishing
to end their pain and suffering. While physician-assisted suicide has not been
legalized under the Dutch penal code and is illegal in the Netherlands, it has
been openly practiced there since 1973.36 This practice remains a crime, al-
beit one that is free from sanctions if performed in accordance with guide-
lines established by the Dutch courts in 1981."7 Since then, physician-
assisted suicide has been practiced according to these guidelines, as inter-
preted by the Dutch courts and the Royal Dutch Medical Association.
In order to avoid prosecution for physician-assisted suicide, the physi-
cian must adhere to the following guidelines designed to protect the interests
of the patient: (1) the patient must be experiencing unbearable pain that can-
not otherwise be relieved by medical intervention; (2) the patient must be
conscious; (3) the patient must make an informed, voluntary, express death
31. See id.
32. See Hall, supra note 23, at 807 n. 24.
33. See id.
34. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. See FuRRoW ETAL., supra note 20, § 17-70, at 425.
37. See International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, Euthanasia in the Netherlands (vis-
ited Apr. 13, 1999) <http://www.iaetf.org> (citing CARLOS GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH:
EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS 32 (1991)) [hereinafter Euthanasia in the
Netherlands].
1999]
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request; (4) the patient must be given alternatives to death and time to con-
sider these alternatives; (5) there must be no other reasonable solutions to the
patient's problem; (6) the patient's death must not inflict unnecessary suf-
fering on others; (7) more than one person must be involved in the decision,
so that the attending physician must consult with another independent physi-
cian; (8) only a physician may assist in the patient's death; (9) great care
must be taken in making the decision; and (10) the attending physician must
report the facts of the patient's case to the coroner.3
While the Royal Dutch Medical Association intended for physicians to
assist in the death of only terminally ill patients in unbearable physical pain,
these guidelines now also encompass those patients enduring psychological
pain. In 1993, a Dutch court acquitted Dr. Chabot, a psychiatrist, who as-
sisted in the suicide of his patient. 9 This patient was a fifty year old woman
in good physical health, but plagued with feelings of depression over her di-
vorce and the deaths of her two sons.' Dr. Chabot, after consulting with
seven other experts, decided to help her end her life by supplying her with a
combination of a narcotic, a muscle relaxant, and a sedative hypnotic."'
The court concluded that the patient's life was unbearable and hopeless,
and that even with lengthy treatment, her recovery would have been lim-
ited.4" The court found Dr. Chabot's indictment to be correct, but declared
his actions to be justifiable and necessary in order to put the welfare of his
patient above the law.43 Thus, the availability of physician-assisted suicide
has not only been provided to patients suffering from intractable physical
pain, but has also been extended to patients experiencing psychological pain.
While the guidelines associated with physician-assisted suicide in the
Netherlands were intended to protect the patient from making coerced or in-
voluntary requests for death, several scholars and experts suggest that this
practice has not been effectively regulated by the guidelines, and that the
safeguards have failed to protect patients." Despite the long-term practice of
physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands, no studies had been conducted
to determine the actual nature of the practice. However, in 1990, a Dutch
government commission, headed by Dr. Jan Remmelink, undertook a na-
38. See id. (citing CARLOS GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF
THE NETHERLANDS 39 (1991)). See also Ezekiel Emanuel, Whose Right To Die, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 73.
39. See Herbert Hendin, Seduced By Death: Doctors, Patients and the Dutch Cure, 10
ISSUES L. & MED. 123 (1994).
40. See Gene Kaufmann, State v. Chabot: A Euthanasia Case From the Netherlands, 20
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 815, 816 (1994).
41. Seeid. at 817.
42. See id. at 818.
43. See Hendin, supra note 39, at 139.
44. See id. See generally Herbert Hendin, The Slippery Slope: The Dutch Example, 35
DUQ. L. REv. 427 (1996); Euthanasia in the Netherlands, supra note 37; John Keown, Eutha-
nasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 407 (1995).
[Vol. 35
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tionwide survey to investigate the Dutch euthanasia practice, including the
practice of physician-assisted suicide.'5 The results of this official govern-
ment study, released in 1991, are commonly referred to as the Remmelink
Report.'
The Remmelink Report revealed that 25,306 cases of euthanasia occur
annually in the Netherlands.47 This number accounts for 19.4% of the
130,000 annual deaths in the Netherlands. While a majority of the euthana-
sia cases involved situations where life-prolonging treatment was withdrawn
or withheld, these 25,306 cases included 2,300 cases of active voluntary
euthanasia where each patient's death occurred as a result of the physician
administering a lethal means to the patient upon the patient's request.49 Also
included are 400 cases of physician-assisted suicide in which each patient's
death occurred as a result of the physician providing the patient with a lethal
means upon the patient's request," and about 1,000 cases of involuntary
euthanasia in which the patients' lives were terminated by their physicians
without the patients' knowledge or consent.5 Of those patients who under-
went involuntary euthanasia, 14% were fully competent, 11% were partially
competent, and 8% were demented elderly individuals.' Further, of these
approximately 1,000 cases of involuntary euthanasia, 72% of the patients
had never expressed a desire to terminate their lives,. and, in 8% of the
cases physicians performed involuntary euthanasia despite the existence of
other treatment alternatives.4
The Remmelink Report also indicated that approximately 22,500 pa-
tients died from morphine overdoses." Of these patients, 8,100 (36% of the
cases) were administered morphine, not for palliative purposes, but with the
intent to terminate life. 6 While these figures document the prevalence of
euthanasia in the Dutch society, the Remmelink Report does not include
cases of euthanasia performed on newborn infants with disabilities, children
with life-threatening conditions, psychiatric patients, or patients with
AIDS.57
Other important findings of the study indicate that about 6,700 requests
45. See, e.g., Paul J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Con-
cerning the End of Life, 338 LANCEr 996, 672 (1991).
46. See Richard Fenigsen, The Report of the Dutch Governmental Committee on Eutha-
nasia, 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 339 (1991) (citations omitted).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Euthanasia in the Netherlands, supra note 37.
54. See Fenigsen, supra note 46, at 343.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
1999]
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for euthanasia are rejected by physicians, which suggests that such requests
are not readily granted, but are given serious consideration by the physi-
cians." The problems associated with physician-assisted suicide thus became
apparent with the release of the Remmelink Report. While this report is a
critical reservoir of information concerning the practice of assisted death in
the Netherlands, it is the data on involuntary euthanasia that raise concern
and tend to advocate against legal approval of assisted death in the United
States.
The Remmelink Report was updated in 1996."9 According to this update,
0.4% of the 9700 assisted suicide requests are acceded to.' Also, 53% of
physicians in the Netherlands had participated in physician-assisted suicide
in the past, while only 29% of them had assisted within the prior two years."
While the 1996 update demonstrated only a minimal increase in the number
of assisted death requests, it has been suggested that the problems identified
by the Remmelink Report have not been eliminated.62
The 1996 update still showed that there was no decrease in the number
of involuntary euthanasia cases, and that involuntary euthanasia was still
performed on incompetent patients who could not have expressly and vol-
untarily requested assistance in dying. 3 Another disturbing observation was
that in 59% of the assisted death cases physicians did not adhere to the es-
tablished guidelines." Next, the update also acknowledged that the practice
was being performed on an estimated 10 to 15% of newborns with fatal or
severely disabling defects.' Finally, while assisted suicide is available to
those in excruciating physical pain, it is also available to those patients who
are enduring psychological pain."
Although the practice of physician-assisted suicide is accepted in the
Netherlands, there is some concern regarding the factors that motivate a pa-
tient to request assistance in dying. Contrary to common perception, pain is
not the major motivating factor. Instead, depression, general psychological
distress, perceived loss of dignity, feelings of being a burden, and the fear of
losing independence appear to be the leading factors. 7 Another matter of
concern is whether the physician has exhausted all other means of palliative
respite before acceding to the patient's request for assistance in dying. All
these issues are of significant importance when determining the propriety of
accepting the practice of physician-assisted suicide as an alternative avail-
58. See id.
59. See Emanuel, supra note 38, at 76.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 77.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 78.
67. See id. at 75.
[Vol. 35
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able to patients in the course of their medical care. Attempts to legalize this
practice should ensure that these issues are never in conflict with the pa-
tients' best interests.
While the Dutch courts and Royal Medical Association have established
guidelines for the protection of patients, it appears from the Remmelink Re-
port, and its 1996 update, that the practice of physician-assisted suicide is
still fraught with problems. There appears to be wide-spread violation of the
safeguards, and a consequent abuse of the practice. To some opponents of
physician-assisted suicide, this may suggest that legalization of this practice
would be detrimental to society. The resultant problems that have surfaced
from the long-term practice of physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands
may provide citizens and lawmakers in the United States an opportunity to
preempt those problems and, instead, adopt the successes associated with the
Dutch practice.
IV. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: CURRENT CASE LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES
Physician-assisted suicide is illegal in every state in the United States
except Oregon. In June 1997, the United States Supreme Court, in a unani-
mous decision, held that an asserted right to assistance in committing suicide
is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the due process clause of
the United States Constitution. 8 The Court found the State of Washington's
ban on assisted suicide to be rationally related to legitimate government in-
terests.6'
In Washington v. Glucksberg, three terminally ill patients, four physi-
cians, and a nonprofit organization brought action against the State of
Washington claiming that a Washington statute banning assisted suicide
violated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution."0 The Court held that the ban did not violate the Due
Process Clause.7' The Court stated that assisted suicide bans in this country
are long-standing expressions of the states' commitment to the protection
and preservation of human life, and that they are consistent and enduring
themes of the philosophical, legal, and cultural heritage of this country.72 The
Court also recognized the refusal of medical treatment as being distinct from
the decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another.73
In this case, the Court found that Washington's ban on assisted suicide
was rationally related to several legitimate government interests. Included
among them is Washington's unqualified interest in the preservation of hu-
68. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997).
69. See id. at 2271.
70. See id. at 2258.
71. See id. at 2261.
72. See id. at 2263.
73. See id. at 2270.
1999]
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man life."' The State also has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics
of the medical profession. The Court recognized that physician-assisted sui-
cide could blur the line between healing and harming, and consequently un-
dermine the trust that is essential to the doctor-patient relationship." Further,
"the State has a [strong] interest in protecting vulnerable groups-including
the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and mis-
takes."'76 According to the Court, these individuals are at the greatest risk of
harm as their "autonomy and well-being are already compromised by pov-
erty, lack of access to good medical care, advanced age, or by virtue of being
a member of a stigmatized group." '77 Finally, the State may have a justifiable
fear that legalizing physician-assisted suicide may lead to involuntary eutha-
nasia.78 According to the Court, this may be a legitimate concern based upon
observations of the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands. The Court
commented that despite the existence of various reporting procedures,
abuses continue, with the vulnerable being affected the most.79 The Court
thus concludes that what is touted as a limited right to assisted suicide may
in effect provide a broader than anticipated license to assist in suicide, which
would be difficult to police and control.'
While it may seem to appear that this Supreme Court ruling has settled
the issue of physician-assisted suicide, quite the contrary is true. In fact, the
Court decision encourages continued debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of legalizing physician-assisted suicide in the United States."
While the Court does not recognize a categorical constitutional right to as-
sisted suicide, Justice Stevens' concurring opinion states in certain situa-
tions, hastening death is a legitimate interest entitled to constitutional pro-
tection. 2 Further, Justice Stevens states that the Court's holding does not
foreclose the possibility that a future plaintiff seeking assistance in dying
may prevail in a more particularized challenge of a state's ban on assisted
suicide. 3
In a companion case, the United States Supreme Court analyzed equal
protection arguments as related to physician-assisted suicide." In Vacco v.
Quill, three physicians and three patients brought action against New York
74. See id. at 2272 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
282 (1990)).
75. See id. at 2273 (citing Assisted Suicide in the United States, Hearing before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 355-
56 (1996)) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass) [hereinafter Kass Testimony].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 2274.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 2275.
82. See id. at 2302-05 (Stevens, J., concurring).
83. See id. at 2309.
84. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
[Vol. 35
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State's Attorney General, challenging the constitutionality of New York
statutes making it a crime to aid a person in committing suicide. 5 The chal-
lenge was based on the claim that New York's ban on assisted suicide vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.86 The Court held that New York's prohibition on
assisted suicide did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 7
The physician respondents claimed that because New York permits a
competent patient to refuse life sustaining treatment, the banning of assisted
suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause as refusal of medical treatment
and assisted suicide were "essentially the same thing."88 The Court, however,
recognized a distinction between physician-assisted suicide and refusal of
unwanted medical treatment, based upon legal traditions and endorsement by
the medical profession. 9 The Court found this "distinction comports with
fundamental legal principles of causation and intent."'
In focusing on the causation issue, the Court reasoned that "when a pa-
tient refuse[d] life-sustaining treatment, [the patient's death results] from an
underlying fatal disease or pathology."' In a physician-assisted suicide
situation, however, the patient ingests a lethal medication which is the cause
of the patient's death.' Thus, the causation issue serves to distinguish be-
tween refusal of medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide.
The Court also analyzed the issue of intent. The Court stated that "a
physician who withdraws, or honors a patient's refusal to begin, life-
sustaining treatment... intend[s] only to respect the patient's wishes." 3 The
Court also found the same to be true when a physician administered "aggres-
sive palliative care... [which may have] hasten[ed] the patient's death, [be-
cause] the physician's purpose and intent [were] only to ease the patient's
pain," not to cause death.94 According to the Court, physician-assisted sui-
cide, however, "must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the
patient be made dead." 5 Thus, the intent issue also provides a distinction
between refusal of unwanted medical treatment and physician-assisted sui-
cide.
Recognizing a distinction between a patient's right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment and the practice of physician-assisted suicide, the Court
found no violation of the equal protection clause because New York was en-
85. See id.
86. See id. at 2295.
87. See id. at 2296.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 2298.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2298-99.
95. ld. at 2299 (citing Kass Testimony, supra note 75, at 367).
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titled to treat unlike cases differently." The Court stated that "the Constitu-
tion does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same.'"
Current case law demonstrates adherence to an almost universal tradi-
tion which rejects an asserted right to physician-assisted suicide. Further, the
Supreme Court's decision in Glucksberg has clearly taken into consideration
the possible abuses of this practice, if legalized, even when extensively
regulated. While the Supreme Court has not completely foreclosed the pos-
sibility of legalization of physician-assisted suicide, it has left that decision
to the individual states to legislate and regulate. Therefore, while there is no
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, it is entirely within each
state's domain to legalize and regulate the practice of physician-assisted sui-
cide within that state. It is clearly within the power of the voters in any state
to legalize physician-assisted suicide, and has been so demonstrated by vot-
ers in Oregon.
V. OREGON'S "DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT"
In 1994, Oregon voters approved a physician-assisted suicide law,
known as Measure 16 or "Death With Dignity Act."'98 This law, which al-
lowed terminally ill patients to end their lives by requesting a physician's
prescription for lethal medication, however, was barred from taking effect
because of a constitutional challenge." Passage of Oregon's "Death With
Dignity Act" (Oregon Act) in November 1997, for the second time, which
permitting physician-assisted suicide, has now placed Oregon at the fore-
front of a national debate regarding this practice. "
The Oregon Act allows a capable terminally ill adult patient who is a
resident of Oregon to initiate a request for lethal medication.'"' Specifically,
the patient who is determined by the attending physician and the consulting
physician to be terminally ill may voluntarily express his or her wish to die
by making an oral request, followed by a written request, for lethal medica-
tion.'2 Unlike the Dutch practice, assistance in dying will be afforded only to
patients suffering from a terminal illness. Patients in psychological pain are
not included under the Oregon Act. The Oregon Act also requires that the
96. See id. at 2297 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982)).
97. Id. (quoting Tignerv. Texas, 310 U.S. 141,147 (1940)).
98. 13 OR. REV. ST. § 2.01 (1998).
99. See Lee v. State of Oregon, 891 F.Supp. 1421 (D. Or. 1995).
100. See See International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, Special Report: Oregon's Death
Wish: The Vote and the Aftermath (visited Apr. 13, 1999) <http://www.iaetf.org>; Goodman,
supra note 4; see also Oregon Residents Back Suicide Law, L.A. DAILY NEWs, Nov. 5, 1997,
at N10; Kim Murphy, Voters in Oregon Soundly Endorse Assisted Suicide, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1997, at AI; Brad Cain, Oregon Suicide Issues Remain, But Lawyers Debate Whether Path
is Clear, THE FRESNO BEE, Nov. 6, 1997, at A6.
101. 13 OR. REv. STAT. § 2.01 (1998).
102. See id.
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patient's decision be an informed decision. 3 The written request must be
signed and dated by the patient, and witnessed by at least two individuals."°
Strict requirements and exclusions apply to the choice of witnesses. If the
requirements of Section 2.01 of the "Death With Dignity Act" are met, the
patient may be prescribed a lethal dose of medication to enable the patient to
end his or her life.
According to the Oregon Act, an "adult" is an individual who is at least
eighteen years of age, and "capable" is defined as being able to make and
communicate health care decisions to health care providers. 5 The "attending
physician" is the doctor with primary responsibility for the care and treat-
ment of the patient, while the "consulting physician" is the doctor qualified
by specialty or experience to render a professional diagnosis and prognosis
about the patient's condition." Further, a "terminal" disease is one that is
incurable and irreversible, and that has been medically confirmed to produce
the patient's death within six months. 7 An "informed decision" is defined as
one made when the patient appreciates the relevant facts after being fully in-
formed by the attending physician of the patient's medical diagnosis and
prognosis, as well as the potential risks associated with, and the probable re-
sult of, taking the prescribed medication."0
In order to protect the interests of patients and health care providers, the
Oregon Act incorporates a number of safeguards to prevent involuntary sui-
cide requests. First, the attending physician is charged with the duty to fully
inform the patient regarding the diagnosis and prognosis, potential risks and
probable result of the prescribed medication, and feasible alternatives."° This
ensures that the patient is being given the relevant information with which to
make a reasoned and informed decision. It gives the patient an opportunity
to assess his or her pending decision in view of the choices available.
Next, the attending physician is also required to refer the patient to a
consulting physician before prescribing lethal medication."0 This clearly
prevents one physician from making a unilateral decision regarding pre-
scribing lethal medication. Further, this safeguard provides for an additional
evaluation of the patient and his or her decision to end life. The prevalence
of involuntary euthanasia, as seen in the Netherlands, would thus be avoided.
Also, the attending and consulting physicians are required to refer the
patient to a counselor if either of them is of the opinion that the patient may
be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder."' While this pro-
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. § 1.01.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. § 3.01.
110. Seeid. § 3.02.
III. See id. § 3.03.
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cedure is in the patient's best interest, it appears to be an inadequate safe-
guard because attending and consulting physicians are not trained to recog-
nize and treat patients with psychiatric or psychological disorders. Further,
according to the Remmelink Report, the motivating reasons for many pa-
tients who requested assistance in dying were depression and psychological
distress."2 Based on this information, it is even more critical that the attend-
ing and consulting physicians be required to refer the patient to a psychiatrist
or psychologist for further evaluation.
The flaw in this safeguard is that referring the patient to a counselor first
requires the attending or consulting physician to identify a psychiatric disor-
der, which the physician may not be competent to do. Prescribing lethal
medication to a patient who has arrived at his or her decision while in a state
of psychological distress does not serve the patient's interests. In such an in-
stance, a request for lethal medication is made by an "incapable" patient, and
prescribing lethal medication to such a patient would be a violation of the
Oregon Act. To prevent the possibility of such a violation, consultation with
a psychiatrist should have been included as a mandatory requirement.
Another safeguard is the requirement that the patient make both an oral
and a witnessed written request for lethal medication."' This procedural re-
quirement forces the patient to evaluate his or her condition and impresses
upon the patient the significance of his or her request. This safeguard also
provides the health care provider with a record of the patient's wishes to
justify prescribing lethal medication.
The patient must also be given the opportunity to rescind his or her re-
quest at any time."' In fact, the attending physician is prohibited from pre-
scribing a lethal dose of medication without offering the patient an opportu-
nity to rescind the prescription request."' This requirement helps ensure that
the patient's request is a voluntary one by allowing the patient an additional
opportunity to evaluate the decision and change it if he or she so desires.
This clearly protects the best interests of the patient by encouraging the pa-
tient to evaluate and reevaluate his or her decision, and also provides the
prescribing physician with an unambiguous indication of the voluntary na-
ture of the patient's decision. Additionally, with the satisfaction of knowing
that there exists a way out, the patient may even decide to postpone decision-
making until later. The right to rescind, as afforded by the Oregon Act, takes
this aspect into consideration to better protect the patient.
The Oregon Act also imposes extensive documentation and reporting
requirements on patients' medical records."6 This helps ensure that health
care providers comply with the Oregon Act, and also facilitates monitoring
of physicians' compliance by state health agencies. This, in turn, protects the
112. See Fenigsen, supra note 46, at 339.
113. OR. REV. STAT. § 3.06 (1998).
114. See id. § 3.07.
115. See id.
116. Seeid. §§3.09,3.11.
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patients' interests.
While these numerous safeguards are designed to serve the patients' in-
terests and protect against the abuses that have been uncovered in the Neth-
erlands, there still appear to be some flaws that may not necessarily serve the
goal of the Oregon Act, which is to provide a dying patient with the right to
request lethal medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified
manner. While the Oregon Act is applicable to all residents of Oregon, the
requirements of residency in Oregon are not stated. This allows physicians to
make determinations of residency, which could allow every citizen in this
country to seek relief under this Act regardless of resident status in Oregon.
In effect, Oregon would become a haven for terminally ill patients in other
states who wish to end their live, but cannot legally obtain lethal medication
in their state.
Next, the Oregon Act allows a physician to prescribe only lethal medi-
cation to be taken by the patient without assistance from any third parties."7
This requirement clearly prohibits lethal injection, mercy killing, or active
euthanasia."' While the Oregon Act does not expressly state so, the limita-
tion imposed by this safeguard indicates that the patient may be given only
oral medication that he or she can self-administer. That being the case, it is
of immense concern that oral medication may not necessarily end the pa-
tient's life. In fact, it has been reported that with lethal oral medication,
death may take hours, or may not occur at all."9 Patients being administered
narcotic pain killers, such as opiates, develop tolerance to the drugs.' Doses
of medication given to such patients, therefore, must be determined by ex-
perimentation, which would only prolong the patients' suffering. A lethal
injection, however, would rapidly achieve blood levels of the medication
sufficient to meet the patient's desired end. In such a situation, if the patient
is to benefit from the right provided by the Oregon Act in choosing a hu-
mane and dignified way to die, lethal injection should be allowed so that the
patient does not linger on against his or her wishes.
Also, oral medication may be difficult or impossible for many termi-
nally ill patients to keep down due to nausea and other effects of their dis-
eased states. In such circumstances, lethal injection may be the only alterna-
tive for these patients to exercise their rights under the Oregon Act. The
Oregon Act, however, does not permit administration of lethal injection,
thereby blocking out a segment of the terminally ill population who wishes
to end its pain and suffering but cannot because oral lethal medication would
117. See id. §3.14.
118. Seeid.
119. See International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, Special Report, Oregon Takes a
Closer Look At Assisted Suicide (visited Apr. 13, 1999) <http://wwwiaetf.org> (citing B.
Coombs Lee et al., Physician Assisted Suicide, in 2 OREGON HEALTH L. MANUAL 8-12
(1997)).
120. See D. R. Jasinski, Tolerance and Dependence to Opiates, 41 AcTA ANAESTHESIOL.
SCAND. 184 (1997).
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be almost futile.
Finally, while the Oregon Act provides a terminally ill and capable adult
patient the right to request lethal medication, the Oregon Act does not re-
quire health care providers to comply with the patient's request. In fact, the
Oregon Act clearly states that no health care provider is under any duty to
participate in the provision of medication to a patient who desires to end his
or her life.'2 ' Instead, the health care provider who is unable or unwilling to
carry out the patient's request is required to transfer the patient and his rec-
ords to a new health care provider.'22 This requirement creates a situation
where the patient may wish to obtain lethal medication, but will find the
right afforded by the Oregon Act to be hollow. The patient will not be able
to obtain the requested prescription without delay. This delay, which would
be created by his or her transfer to another health care provider, only means
that the patient will linger on for some more time and will continue to endure
pain. Besides the delay involved with the transfer, the new health care pro-
vider may wish to evaluate the patient again because the Oregon Act does
not mandate that the new health care provider simply accept the previous
physician's evaluation and prescribe the requested medication.
Oregon's "Death With Dignity Act" provides several safeguards against
abuse so that the patients' interests are protected. While these procedural re-
quirements will help ensure that the abuses observed in the Dutch system do
not pervade the practice of physician-assisted suicide in Oregon, in practice,
the various flaws of this legislation may interfere with the patients' right to a
humane and dignified end. As the Oregon Act has taken effect in Oregon, it
will function as an experiment of physician-assisted suicide practice in the
United States. While this legislation will no doubt serve the interests of a
majority of qualifying terminally ill patients, legislative modification of this
law seems to be inevitable.
VI. ATTEMPTS TO LEGALIZE PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE IN CALIFORNIA
Besides legislatures that have attempted to legalize physician-assisted
suicide, public interest groups have advocated to legalize the practice in the
United States. In 1988, the Hemlock Society attempted to place an initiative
on the California ballot, but was unsuccessful in procuring sufficient support
for the initiative.' Subsequently, in 1992, California's "Death With Dignity
Act" was placed on the ballot as Proposition 161.24 Although Proposition
161 was popularly supported prior to the vote, it failed to pass. It has been
suggested that moral uncertainty and the fear of inadequate safeguards con-
121. See OR. REv. STAT. § 4.01 (1997).
122. See id.
123. See Antonios P. Tsarouhas, The Case Against Legal Assisted Suicide, 20 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 793, 797 (1993).
124. See id.
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tributed to the defeat of Proposition 161."
The purpose of California's "Death With Dignity Act" (California Act)
was to provide mentally competent terminally ill adults the legal right to
voluntarily request and receive a physician's assistance in dying.'26 The Cali-
fornia Act gives a terminally ill patient the freedom of self-determination
and the right to choose to eliminate pain and suffering. 7 Accordingly, a
mentally competent terminally ill adult patient could execute a directive
governing the administration of aid-in-dying. 8 This directive had to be in
writing, signed by the patient, and witnessed by two adults. 9 Strict witness
requirements were included to protect the patient's interests. Although the
California Act imposed certain basic requirements, it was flawed by the lack
of procedural requirements designed to protect the patient's interests. Thus,
the absence of safeguards left room for abuse.
Unlike the Oregon Act, the California Act did not mandate that the pa-
tient's decision be an informed decision. In fact, the text of the California
Act was silent regarding the physician's responsibility to explain to the pa-
tient the medical diagnosis, prognosis, probable result of lethal medication,
and other available alternatives. 3 ' According to the California Act, the ter-
minally ill patient had to be competent."' This would imply that the patient
make an informed decision. Without providing the patient all the relevant in-
formation, however, it is impossible to ensure that the decision is an in-
formed one.
Next, the decision to render aid in dying was that of a single physician.
The California Act did not require the attending physician to refer the patient
to a consulting physician.' This allowed the attending physician to make a
unilateral decision. Instead, involving another physician in the consultation
would allow for a more confident evaluation of the patient's competence and
the voluntary nature of his or her request to end life.
Like the Oregon Act, the California Act did not require that the patient
be referred to a psychiatrist or psychologist for evaluation prior to comply-
ing with the patient's request. Instead, the attending physician could refer the
patient for a psychiatric consultation if the physician had any concerns re-
garding the patient's competence. Thus, the initial determination of a pa-
tient's competence would be made by the attending physician who, in all
probability, would have had no training in psychiatry and would, therefore,
not be the ideal evaluator of the patient's competence. As observed in the
125. See Eugenie A. Gifford, Artes Moriendi: Active Euthanasia and the Art of Dying,
40 UCLA L. REv. 1545, 1547 (1993).
126. See Tsarouhas, supra note 123, at 797.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
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Netherlands, if the patient's request for assistance in dying was rooted in de-
pression or psychological despondency, the patient would be allowed to re-
ceive assistance in dying even when he or she was mentally incapable of
making such a decision. Such a patient would have had no protection under
the California Act. Clearly, this was a serious flaw in the California Act.
Further, like the Oregon Act, the California Act disapproved of mercy
killing.' This provision implied that only those lethal methods could be
provided that the patient could self-administer. Thus only a lethal dose of
oral medication, which the patient could administer without a physician's as-
sistance, could be prescribed according to the California Act. Oral medica-
tion, however, would not assist those patients who were battling serious
bouts of nausea due to their illnesses. Also, if the oral medication did not
lead to the patient's death, the patient's suffering would continue because
administering a lethal injection would violate the California Act. While this
may not be regarded as a flaw, it is certainly a shortcoming of a legislation
that purported to provide a terminally ill patient the right to choose when to
end suffering and pain.
Finally, the California Act allowed any health care provider to refuse to
comply with a patient's request for assistance in dying if the provider was
religiously, morally, or ethically opposed to participating in such a prac-
tice.' In such a situation, the health care provider would be required to
transfer the patient to another health care professional. Once again, while
this is not necessarily a flaw that raises concerns of possible abuse, it creates
the possibility that patients may not be able to exercise their right to choose
when to end the suffering brought on by a terminal illness. The delay that
would be caused by transfer arrangements would only prolong the patient's
suffering.
The California Act did not appeal to the voters, probably because of the
various flaws that could be anticipated to surface. While a voluntary and re-
peated request by the patient was required before the physician could pre-
scribe lethal medication,'35 the various shortcomings of the California Act
would have undoubtedly undermined the ability of patients to request assis-
tance in dying.
Subsequently, in 1996, a team of Hemlock Society members, physi-
cians, lawyers, and academicians drafted the Model State Act to Authorize
and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide.36 The principal purpose of this Act
was to enable a terminally ill individual to request and receive assistance
from a physician in obtaining the medical means to end his or her life. 3
Legislators were invited to use this Model Act when formulating the provi-
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide (visited
Mar. 21, 1996) <http://www.finalexit.org>.
137. See id. § 1.
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sions of proposed physician-assisted suicide laws.'
The Model State Act (Model Act) includes improved provisions com-
pared to the Oregon Act and the California Act. Included are safeguards to
protect against involuntary euthanasia, as observed in the Dutch practice, as
well as provisions ensuring that the requesting patient's right to request as-
sistance in dying is honored. Like the Oregon Act and the California Act, the
Model Act offers physician-assisted suicide only to terminally ill competent
adult patients.'39 It also requires the responsible or attending physician to se-
cure a written opinion from a consulting physician who has evaluated the
patient requesting assistance in dying.'" Further, the health care provider is
not required to administer the medical means of suicide to the patient if the
provider is conscientiously opposed to such a practice. 4'
Unlike the Oregon Act and the California Act, however, the Model Act
would require the attending physician to also secure a written opinion from a
licensed psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or psychiatric social worker who
is qualified to make assessments of the patient's mental state and who has
evaluated the patient.' 2 This provision is designed to safeguard the patient's
interests and ensure that the patient is competent to make a request for a le-
thal medical means. Thus, a patient who requests assistance in dying while
under the influence of depression or psychological distress may be appropri-
ately counseled. This safeguard provides a means to combat the abuse as
evidenced in the Dutch practice wherein mentally depressed patients were
euthanized because of the lack of psychiatric evaluation by trained psychia-
trists.
Further, the Model Act would authorize a physician to provide a quali-
fying terminally ill patient with a medical means of suicide. 43 "Medical
means of suicide" is defined as medical substances or devices supplied to the
patient for the purpose of enabling the patient to end his or her life." The
Model Act would also allow the physician to be present and assist the patient
at the time the patient makes use of such medical means.45 These provisions
overcome the flaws inherent in the Oregon Act and the California Act. If
oral medication proves to be ineffective in carrying out the patient's request,
the physician would be authorized to administer to the patient any other
medical means, including lethal injection, thus preventing continued suffer-
ing of the patient.
Another attempt to legalize physician-assisted suicide in California was
made in 1997, with the Proposed Model California Act of 1997 (Proposed
138. See id.
139. See id. § 3(a).
140. See id. § 5(a).
141. See id. § 11.
142. See id. § 5(b).
143. See id.
144. Id. § 2(d).
145. See id. § 3(b).
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California Act). 6 The Proposed California Act maintains provisions com-
mon to the Oregon Act and the California Act, but also incorporates some of
the provisions of the Model Act. The Proposed California Act requires a
second medical opinion, recognizes the dying patient's absolute right to re-
voke consent to receiving assistance in dying, requires reporting of the as-
sisted death to the State Director of Health Services, and allows health care
providers to refuse to assist the patient in dying if they are opposed to such a
practice. 47
While the Proposed California Act does not require referral of the pa-
tient to a mental health professional, as does the Model Act, it recommends
such an evaluation. 4 This would help ensure the mental competency of the
patient so that it is certain that a competent patient's request is being com-
plied with. In this manner, three opportunities for evaluation of the patient
are afforded to health care providers to ensure that the patient's decision is
voluntary, informed, and competent. Because the Proposed California Act
does not mandate psychiatric evaluation, there is room for mistake, particu-
larly when the attending and consulting physicians are not competent to
make determinations of patients' mental conditions.
The Proposed California Act, like the Model Act, would permit admini-
stration of lethal drugs or devices to bring about the patient's death. 49 It
states that if the chosen means do not produce death in four hours, other
means would be allowed.' This provision indicates that if oral lethal medi-
cation was futile in achieving the patient's request for death, lethal injection
could be administered by the physician. The Proposed California Act, there-
fore, would permit a physician to administer the lethal means to the patient.
Thus, the patient's right to request an end to his or her pain and suffering
would not be merely a hollow right.
While the enhanced provisions of the Proposed California Act will
guard against some of the abuses prevalent in the Dutch practice, such as in-
voluntary euthanasia, the Proposed California Act is not guaranteed to en-
sure that the patient's decision is made while he or she is competent. To en-
sure a competent decision, consultation by a psychiatric professional must be
made mandatory, as in the Model Act. Amendment of this provision, to in-
clude mandatory evaluation by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, would
probably make the Proposed California Act more acceptable to voters.
VII. CONCLUSION
Immense pain and suffering, and loss of dignity stemming from the pa-
tient's lack of bodily control and autonomy associated with a terminal ill-
146. See Tsarouhas, supra note 123, at 799.
147. Seeid.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
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ness, supports compelling arguments in favor of legalization of physician-
assisted suicide. While it is necessary that a patient be given the right to de-
termine when to end pain and suffering, it is also necessary that any legisla-
tion legalizing physician-assisted suicide be designed to protect the patient's
best interests, and guard against abuse of the practice whereby patients' lives
are, in effect, involuntarily terminated. Designing laws in the United States
that take into consideration the pitfalls of the Dutch practice will help ensure
that only competent and voluntary requests for assistance in dying are com-
plied with. The Oregon Act, Proposed California Act, and Model Act strive
to achieve this end by the inclusion of several desirable safeguards. While it
may seem almost certain that these acts will need to be amended so as to
better serve patients' interests while still guarding against abuses, these acts
represent significant strides in favor of establishing a patient's right to
autonomy and choice in determining end of life issues.
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